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1. The initial question: Unusually high German current account surpluses—
good or bad for whom? 
 
German foreign trade is accustomed to success. For around fifty years, the German 
external trade balance has consistently shown a positive result. With very few 
exceptions, following German reunification, the trade in goods with foreign countries 
has only known surpluses. Meanwhile, the surplus, amounting to more than 8% in 
relation to the gross domestic product for 2016, has reached an unusually high level, 
even by German standards. 
 
The constantly increasing German current account surpluses have engendered a 
controversial discussion on the effects of current account imbalances, which in turn is 
nothing new. In the last few years before the outbreak of the financial and economic 
crisis of 2008/09, for instance, the debate was focused mainly on the US current 
account deficits and China’s high surpluses. However, the debate has recently 
intensified, especially with regard to the German role in securing stability and growth 
within the common euro area on the one hand, but also with regard to the German role 
in tandem with the most important industrialized nations. 
 
Critics maintain that Germany has unreasonably high current account surpluses. A 
generally considered acceptable bandwidth would be between 2.5% and a maximum 
of 5%. The maximum for Germany is thus considered to be around 4.5%. This 
prompted the EU Commission to open a review procedure against Germany in 
November 2013. It was said that Germany, with its excessive current account 
surpluses, makes it more difficult for other European countries to reduce their deficits, 
thus jeopardizing the stability of the eurozone. 
 
The discussion surrounding ‘current account imbalances’ raises two fundamental 
questions: first, there is no universally recognized agreement on what should 
constitute an excessive current account surplus or deficit and, second, in economic 
science, opinion is divided on the effects a country’s current account surplus can exert 
on its trading partners.  
 
Supporters of the ‘savings-glut’ hypothesis postulate that a country’s current account 
surplus translates into savings for other countries, which lead to lower interest rates 
and make additional investments possible—but which also lead to excessive lending. 
                                                          
1 Dr. Detlev Ehrig, Senior lecturer for economics at the University of Bremen until 2016. Adress: 
Wiedstraße 27, D-28217 Bremen, e-mail dehrig@uni-bremen.de. 
120 
 
Others argue that the German current account surplus may be attributed to insufficient 
domestic demand for imports vis-à-vis exports. As a result, the macroeconomic 
development in other countries will be constrained. Hence, economic policy must take 
corrective action. Germany has to reduce its surpluses if it does not want to jeopardize 
European cohesion and the accustomed world economic order with the US as the 
dominant nation. 
 
On the other hand, perception inside Germany itself has an unequivocal, albeit 
completely different, take on the situation. Put bluntly, this boils down to the 
following arguments: the Germans have disciplined markets and superior products; 
they are also industrious and modest when it comes to consumption and spending their 
money. In short: it’s hardly their fault that they are so successful. If other countries 
want to succeed, they must follow their example. 
 
What, then, is the real answer to high surpluses and the heated debate over the 
attribution of responsibility that results? Is the dispute merely guided by envy and as 
such to be referred to social psychologists? Or does it present a real threat to the 
stability of an entire economic area? 
 
2. Current account balances: The financial side and the real economy side 
 
Current account balances show a financial side, which represents the balance 
mechanics of the national accounts. Domestic macroeconomic balances therefore 
generate corresponding current account balances in the case of ex-post differences 
between savings and investments. Surpluses are then reflected in savings overhangs 
vis-à-vis net investment. This gives rise to a supposition: namely, current account 
surpluses are a reflex to a structural savings surplus—possibly even a phenomenon of 
mature economies. 
 
A current account surplus is thus matched by an equally large macroeconomic 
financial balance, which means that total domestic savings (S) exceed total domestic 
investment (I). At the same time, a current account surplus, taking into account the 
balance of capital transfers vis-à-vis other countries, can be regarded as an increase in 
the net financial assets of the German economy. Domestic savings therefore flow 
either into domestic investment or into changes in net financial assets, i.e. changes in 
net receivables vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Owing to this relationship, the current 
account balance is alternatively referred to in the literature as the net outflow of an 
economy. When looking for sources for the rise in the financial result, the corporate 
sector in particular stands out: it has had a financial surplus for more than ten years. 
This is rather unusual, in that the corporate sector is commonly considered to be a net 
debtor in an economy. In the context of circulation theory, financial deficits in the 
corporate sector thus normally find their equivalent in corresponding financial 
surpluses of private households. Financial surpluses in the corporate sector amount to 
retained earnings as a reflex to high export demand with simultaneous wage restraint 




If it is really the case that a savings glut is an expression of a mature economy, current 
account surpluses should not be solely a German issue, but a common problem of 
developed economies. That would considerably qualify the thesis that there is a lack 
of investment in Germany. It would thus not equate to a location weakness, but rather 
a to secular phenomenon of over-saving. 
 
The other side of current account surpluses, the real economy, has its historical roots 
in Germany’s economic resurgence after the Second World War. It was Germany’s 
systematic embedding in the international division of labour that initially set the 
course for an export orientation in the area of high-quality consumer products—but, 
in turn, also for investment in capital goods. Should Germany really now be blamed 
for these historically rooted strengths? It surely cannot be blamed for partaking of the 
blessings created by the international division of labour. But it may well be accused 
jeopardizing the stability of the international economic community, especially within 
the euro area. What could be a possible catalogue of measures capable of stemming 
the historic trend of economizing and investing in a mature economy look like? 
Proposals to introduce a brake on the current account seem to offer a fruitful approach. 
 
3. The shared destiny of debtor and creditor 
 
Since the beginning of monetary union, Germany has been among the creditor nations; 
not just within the European Union, but also the major players in the global economy, 
notably the US and Asia. However, being a creditor involves considerable risks. 
Deficits, provided that the debt cannot be serviced from currency reserves, presuppose 
the willingness of lenders to finance them. With the outbreak of global financial crisis 
in 2008, borrowers were deprived of access to international capital markets, cutting 
them off from sources for funding their current account deficits. In such a situation, 
insolvency threatens. Even the US had to resort to borrowing to finance its deficits. 
 
For its part, Germany was more strongly dependent on the development of the world 
economy than it would have liked. During the financial crisis, it experienced a 
significant blow to its exports. Germany had to face up to the painful fact that as a 
surplus country it depends on the solvency of its debtors. The German banking crisis 
was characterized above all by the bad debts owed by US mortgage banks. The upshot 
was that the taxpayers had to bail out the German banking system, which before the 
crisis had been engaged in crisis countries like Greece as a lender. Debtors and 
creditors are in the same boat. 
 
When debtors and creditors in the global markets are bound together in a common 
destiny, what stance should a surplus economy like Germany adopt in the strategic 
debate on current account surpluses? Specifically: What should a surplus economy 
take responsibility for—and what not? What could be the goal of a responsible policy 





While it seems obvious that a debate on current account balances should not be 
directed against the market, at the same time it is clear that there must be rules to 
govern the institutional design of market activity and its consequences. First and 
foremost, in the absence of exchange rate adjustments via floating currencies within 
a common euro area, there must be an institutional framework for the regulation of 
external imbalances. Although a common exchange rate may be considered to 
contribute towards establishing foreign trade equilibrium, it has in fact led to a 
consolidation of existing imbalances. Germany has coped well with the increase in 
the euro exchange rate against the dollar, but not the southern eurozone countries. 
 
The German current account surplus, together with the bail-out policy, was largely 
responsible for the euro more or less maintaining its exchange rate value during the 
financial crisis. The decline in current account deficits in the crisis countries of the 
eurozone that has meanwhile occurred is more due to a cyclical reduction in imports 
rather than to regained competitiveness. The heterogeneity of the member states has 
impaired the functioning of the euro exchange rate as a balancing instrument.  
 
A regulatory mechanism for the economic strength of the individual member states, 
similar to that of the fiscal equalization scheme operated by the German Länder, is 
thus on the political agenda. More than had been expected, surplus and deficit 
countries are fatefully linked. More than ever before, it is less a matter of creditor 
protection than debtor protection; creditors must be interested in the long-term 
solvency of their debtors if they are not to risk losses on their foreign receivables. 
 
It’s also about the political costs of permanent imbalances. The financial crisis reveals 
the vicious circle of macroeconomic crisis, sovereign debt, and banking crisis. These 
are the breeding grounds for trade wars and economic isolationism—and thus for the 
potential collapse of a whole economic area. Trade on the basis of comparative cost 
advantages can only function successfully by creating a net welfare effect for all the 
participating economies. The international division of labour must be worthwhile for 
everyone, or it will not be sustainable. 
 
4. A possible catalogue of measures to regulate current account surpluses 
 
If we assume that the deeper cause not only of the German (!) current account 
surpluses can be attributed to the cyclical gap between S and I in the sense of S> I, 
then the following question must be answered: How can savings be reduced and how 
can investments be increased?  
 
At first glance, monetary policy seems to play a strategic role in raising real interest 
rates. Whether it can bring about a reduction in savings, though, given that the 
currently prevailing real interest rates are at zero and savings exceed net investment, 
appears most improbable. 
 
Of course, other policy measures are also conceivable, be they in the form of increased 
taxes on income and wealth in order to curb savings, or restrictions on saving for the 
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future through a change in pension policy such as a later pensionable age—pensioners 
save less than employed persons—or possibly even the contrary: earlier retirement 
leads to a reduction in net savings as result of drawing on pension rights. 
 
With regard to investments, the classic instruments come to mind, such as subsidies 
or tax relief on real capital formation, e.g. in the field of renewable energies, or public 
infrastructure investments in the field of education, transport, or communication tech-
nology. 
 
5. Putting the brakes on the current account 
 
Reducing the current account surplus over the course of macroeconomic financial 
accounting correspondingly entails the acceptance of budget deficits, and 
consequently government debt.  
 
What does Germany stand to gain from putting the brakes on its current account 
surpluses? Germany has a genuinely strong interest in the continued existence of the 
eurozone. Bringing about a reduction in current account surpluses could prevent the 
breakup of the euro area. Under the conditions of prescribed austerity, surplus 
countries appear too strong and other countries see themselves as too weak in the 
common market. Centrifugal forces both in the strong as well as the weak economies 
could push for exit—the strong ones for fear of a transfer union, the weaker ones for 
fear of economic hegemony on the part of Germany. 
 
When it actually comes to reducing the current account surplus, there is much to be 
said for expanding much needed public spending, especially for long-term 
infrastructure investments. Neglected schools and the poor state of roads and bridges 
send a clear message for urgent action. The same applies to public digitalization 
projects in order to make Germany fit for the age of ‘Industry 4.0’. 
 
